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PUNITIVE POLICIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
HAZARDS OF NON-CONSENSUAL TESTING OF
WOMEN FOR PRENATAL DRUG USE
Derk B.K VanRaalte IVt
WOMEN'S ADVOCATES SEEK s3 MILLION AND END TO
ARRESTS OF PREGNANT WOMEN AT SOUTH CAROLINA
HOSPITAL
Press Conference 1:00 P.M.
171 Church Street, Charleston, South Carolina
CHARLESTON, Oct. 5, 1993 - In the first case of its kind in
the nation, the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy to-
day urged the federal district court in South Carolina to en-
join a racially discriminatory program that threatens prose-
cution of pregnant women or women in labor who test
positive for cocaine. The $3 million class action lawsuit as-
serts that the Charleston Interagency Policy - implemented
in October 1989 . . . violates a number of constitutional
guarantees, including the right to privacy, the right to refuse
medical treatment, and the right to procreate. Under the pol-
icy, women suspected of using cocaine while pregnant are
[tested without their knowledge] and referred to inappropri-
ate or inaccessible drug treatment and told they will be ar-
rested if they do not comply with the treatment ordered.'
INTRODUCTION
IN THE MIDST OF AMERICA'S "War on Drugs," the
realm of maternal-fetal rights has developed into a constitu-
tional battleground. With a rising incidence of cocaine use by
women of child-bearing age, some studies have shown as many
as 10% of infants may have faced exposure to some form of
t B.S., Clemson University, 1992; J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of
Law, 1995. The author thanks Professor Melvin Durschlag for his comments as the faculty
supervisor of this Note. The opinions expressed in this Note are solely those of the author.
1. The Center for Reproductive Law & Policy, Press Release, in reference to the
filing of Ferguson v. Charleston, No. 2-93-2624-2 (D.S.C. filed Oct. 5, 1993).
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illegal drugs while in the womb.2 These statistics, obviously of
concern to the medical community, have brought the issue of
maternal drug use to the forefront of legal and political debate.
Governmental and professional responses to the problem of
maternal drug use have differed vastly. While all agree that
drug use is undesirable during pregnancy, proposals to remedy
the problem have ranged from education, counseling, and vol-
untary treatment to more controversial means such as involun-
tary civil commitment or criminal prosecution. Focusing on the
recent trend toward treatment by criminal prosecution, this
Note explores (1) the nature and extent of the harm caused by
drug use during pregnancy; and (2) the medical efficacy and
constitutional concerns implicated by punitive policies. In con-
clusion, proposals for a more medically effective, yet legally
permissible, plan will be proffered.
I. SOCIETAL AND PERSONAL COSTS OF DRUG
USE DURING PREGNANCY
Considering the vast array of illicit drugs in common use,
little more than generalities can be drawn without first narrow-
ing the range of inquiry. Within the confines of this Note, the
primary medical focus will be limited to the costs associated
with prenatal exposure to cocaine.3 Although the documented
medical information on the subject arises from current studies,
statistical problems still plague this budding area of research.
In particular, difficulty has been encountered in isolating the
effects of cocaine use on fetal outcome from common environ-
mental factors such as poor maternal nutrition, inadequate pre-
natal care, and the use of alcohol and tobacco.
2. Amercian Public Health Ass'n, Statement No. 9020, Illicit Drug Use by Pregnant
Women, 8 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 240 (1990) [hereinafter APHA]; Committee on Substance
Abuse, American Academy of Pediatrics, Drug-Exposed Infants, 86 PEDIATRICS 639, 640
(Oct. 4, 1990) [hereinafter PEDIATRICS] (finding in a survey of 36 private and public hospi-
tals that 11% of delivering women had used illicit drugs during pregnancy).
3. This focus on cocaine appears warranted, for the same studies showing that up to
11 % of pregnant women have used drugs during pregnancy, also suggest that 75% of
these same women used cocaine. Helen M. Cole, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy:
Court-ordered Medical Treatments and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior
by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA 2663, 2666 (1990).
4. Cole, supra note 2, at 2666; Ira J. Chasnoff, Drugs, Alcohol, Pregnancy, and the
Neonate: Pay Now or Pay Later, 266 JAMA 1567, 1567 (1991).
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A. Health Risks Incurred By Pregnant Women
Women who abuse cocaine face a variety of risks. Even
exclusive of pregnancy, cocaine use creates significant health
risks. These risks include dysrhythmias, hypertension, myocar-
dial infarction, angina, hyperthermia, chest pains, and cerebral
vascular accidents. 5
Additional complications arise when cocaine use accompa-
nies pregnancy. The American Public Health Association
(APHA) attributes drug use to an increased incidence of spon-
taneous abortion and abruptio placentae.6 Even if these condi-
tions are successfully avoided, the addicted woman still faces a
magnified risk of premature labor and delivery.7
The health risks, however, are hardly confined to the ex-
pectant mother. The fetus also may face a number of increased
risks. Given the prevalence of premature birth in these cases, it
is not surprising that the American Medical Association
(AMA) chronicled a problem of low birth weight." Further de-
velopmental defects may surface in the form of below average
head circumference.9 Other, potentially more catastrophic,
risks include an increased chance of stroke,"' increased risk of
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome,"' and the possibility of
seizures in the infant.12
The impact on the quality of the infant's future life also
may be affected. The developmental retardation resulting in
low birth weight and small head circumference is often accom-
5. Sigmund Kharasch, et al., Esophagitis, Epiglottitis, and Cocaine Alkaloid
('Crack'): 'Accidental' Poisoning or Child Abuse?, 86 PEDIATRICS 117, 117 (1990).
6. "Abruptio placentae" is defined as "premature detachment of the placenta often
attended by maternal systemic reactions in the form of shock, oliguria, and fibrinoge-
nopenia." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MED. DICTIONARY 5 (27th ed. 1988); APHA, supra
note 2, at 240.
7. Chasnoff, supra note 4, at 1567; APHA, supra note 2, at 240.
8. Chasnoff, supra note 4, at 1567.
9. Cole, supra note 3, at 2666.
10. 1 STATE COUNCIL ON MATERNAL, INFANT AND CHILD HEALTH CARE, OFF. OF
THE GOVERNOR OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1991 SOuTH CAROLINA PREVALENCE STUDY
AMONG WOMEN GIVING BIRTH (1991) [hereinafter MICH I Study].
11. APHA, supra note 2, at 1567.
12. PEDIATRICS, supra note 2, at 639. However, such early alarms may not have
been fully supported by later evidence. Several studies question the existence of "crack
babies" and even Dr. Chasnoff has been quoted as stating "[i]t is wrong to paint a stere-
otypical picture of the so-called 'crack babies' as a lost generation." Kathy Fackelmann,
The Crack-Baby Myth, WASH. CITY PAPER, Dec. 11, 1991, at 25, 27.
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panied by later emotional and behavioral abnormalities.18 The
South Carolina State Council on Maternal, Infant and Child
Health (MICH) found learning disabilities and lack of mother-
child bonding often plagued these children long after birth. 4
Notably absent, however, has been any conclusive evidence that
the oftentimes feared and much publicized "cocaine-with-
drawal syndrome" is present in newborns.15
Cocaine use by expectant mothers imposes costs which rip-
ple outward until they are eventually borne by society as a
whole. Some of these costs are unsurprising. For instance, in-
fants who experienced low birth weight and poor nutrition re-
quire greatly increased levels of intensive, expensive health
care.
16
Other societal costs are equally troubling, yet less palpa-
ble. Maternal drug use has been linked to lack of maternal
bonding and increased intra-family stress. 17 Rather than re-
maining a problem only in the abstract, this fundamental fail-
ure within the family rapidly transforms into problems for the
community. In its study Drug Exposed Infants: A Generation
at Risk, the General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that
infants born to drug abusing mothers were more likely to enter
foster care programs, more likely to require special education
services, and more likely to be underachievers with respect to
both educational and occupational goals. 8
This litany of horrors, however, has not been universally
accepted in the scientific community. Dr. Barry Zuckerman
fears that
"[V]alid concern about the high rate of cocaine use among
pregnant women has resulted in an apparent rush to judg-
13. Chasnoff, supra note 4, at 1567.
14. MICH 1 Study, supra note 10, at 9.
15. Telephone Interview with Dr. William C. MacLean, Jr., Vice President of Pedi-
atric Nutritional Research and Development of Ross (Abbott) Laboratories (Mar. 30,
1994). In some infants, irritability, lethargy, and other symptoms have been observed.
"Many [infants], however, seem to have no specific clinical manifestations [of withdrawal]
in the early neonatal period." PEDIATRICS, supra note 2, at 640. However, Dr. MacLean
has suggested that statistical data in this field may lag behind common experience. Dr.
MacLean reflected that although thorough statistical studies may not exist to demonstrate
these carryover effects, it would not surprising to find experts willing to testify to the
manifestation.
16. MICH I Study, supra note 10, at 10.
17. Id. at 11.
18. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG EXPOSED INFANTS: A GENERATION
AT RISK 7-8, 37-39 (1993) [hereinafter GAO STUDY].
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ment about the extent and permanency of specific effects of
intrauterine cocaine exposure on newborns. Predictions of an
adverse developmental outcome for these children are being
made despite a lack of supportive scientific evidence. 19
Behavioral and psychological abnormalities might arguably be
as related to environmental factors surrounding the family as to
the physiological effects of cocaine. But, in the final analysis,
these distinctions may be spurious. Whether the burdens thrust
upon society result from the drug culture or from cocaine itself,
removing women from the grasp of addiction will invariably be
beneficial. 20
B. Factors Affecting Drug Use Among Women
1. Demographics in General
Drug abuse as a whole is not confined to minorities, to the
inner city, or to the poor. Studies have demonstrated that,
while the drug of choice may vary based on demographic fac-
tors, overall drug use tends to be roughly equal among the
races.2 1 However, race and income are predictors of cocaine us-
age. The MICH study found that women on Medicaid were
over seventeen times more likely than women with private in-
surance to use cocaine as the drug of choice. 2 Comparisons
made by race were also telling. Blacks studied in South Caro-
lina were 5.7 times more likely than whites to use cocaine.2 8
19. Linda C. Mayes et al., Commentary, The Problem of Prenatal Cocaine Expo-
sure: A Rush to Judgment, 267 JAMA 406, 406 (1992).
20. This suggestion is one harkening back to "family values." Politicians can talk
about family values and promise to improve education. However, such efforts will be futile
unless maternal drug use is first addressed. Even if problems in the family remain, at least
they will be more manageable. By creating positive family role models, there may also be
some spillover benefits as well.
21. MICH 1 Study, supra note 10, at 24.
22. Id.
23. Id. This is not to suggest that other races use fewer drugs; overall, drug usage is
roughly equal. However, these statistics provide a foundation for the attack on punitive
policies as "underinclusive." See infra note 78.
Although statistics seem to suggest correlation between poverty and overall drug use,
it is unclear why African-Amercians display a higher incidence of cocaine use. What is
clear is that blacks use cocaine approximately six times more frequently than other races.
Id. at 7, 25.
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2. Women Have Distinct Needs In Treatment
Drug addiction may not discriminate between the sexes,
but it does appear to have different causes. Since the motiva-
tions driving women to drug abuse are often distinct from those
prompting men, successful attempts to treat female addiction
must cater to different needs. Depression, high stress, and low
self-esteem are strikingly common among addicted women.
These coping problems are further compounded by the poverty
and homelessness often faced by the poor of both sexes.
Perhaps the single most telling similarity among drug
abusing women is a history of victimization. Childhood rape
and incest, battery, and exposure to alcoholic lifestyles charac-
terize the experiences of a vast majority of drug abusing
women. 5 Noting that as many as 90 % of women addicts faced
such lives, Lynn Paltrow concluded that "[d]rug abuse for
these women [w]as not a self-indulgent pastime, but rather a
form of self-medication in lives filled with pain and abuse." 26
Women also face unique obstacles and have special needs
in the context of treatment. Most services, designed to treat
drug use by men, "are not responsive to the psychological, so-
cial, and economic conditions in women's lives." 7 One of the
most obvious needs is that of child care. The general shortage
of drug-treatment facilities is exacerbated by the fact that few
facilities accept pregnant women and even fewer offer child
care.28 Should a woman find treatment at all, it often necessi-
tates that she leave her children in the hands of relatives or
24. Lynn M. Paltrow, Perspective of a Reproductive Rights Attorney, THE FUTURE
OF CHILDREN, Spring 1991, at 85 (citing Beth Glover Reed, Developing Women-sensitive
Drug Dependent Treatment Services: Why So Difficult?, 19 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 151,
153 (Apr. 1987)).
25. Id.; see also Study Examines Access to Substance Abuse Treatment for Women,
SPECIAL DELIVERY (Southern Regional Project on Infant Mortality, Washington, D.C.),
Fall 1993, at 1, 1 [hereinafter SPECIAL DELIVERY NEWSLETTER] (stating that one study
concluded that "[w]omen in rural areas were also much more likely to express shame over
their addiction and experience domestic violence and sexual abuse.")
26. Paltrow, supra note 24, at 86.
27. Id. at 86.
28. COALITION ON ALCOHOL AND DRUG DEPENDENT WOMEN AND THEIR CHIL-
DREN, STATEMENT ON ACCESS TO ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG DEPENDENCY TREATMENT
(Dec. 1990) [hereinafter ADDWTC] (stating that
"[C]urrently there are only a few treatment centers which either provide childcare
services or assist women in finding such services. . . .Alcohol and drug dependent
women who are pregnant face even greater barriers to obtaining treatment. Many
programs refuse to provide services to pregnant women because of concerns about
[Vol. 5:443
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foster care.29 Forcing women to surrender their children in or-
der to pursue recovery effectively serves as a barrier to women
seeking treatment.3
C. Addiction Is A Disease
Health care professionals and the courts have both recog-
nized addiction to be a legitimate disease. Medical and social
organizations including the Association of Maternal and Child
Health (AMCH), the March of Dimes, the National Associa-
tion for Perinatal Addiction Research and Education
(NAPARE), the American Society of Addiction Medicine
(ASAM), the APHA, and the National Council on Alcholism
and Drug Dependence (NCADD) concur in characterizing ad-
diction as an illness or disease. The AMCH even specifically
states that "addiction is an illness and [it] has been shown to
persist despite adverse consequences."3 1
The United States Supreme Court has long accepted that
addiction is a medical condition beyond the control of the indi-
vidual. As early as 1924, the Court announced in Linder v.
United States that addicts "are diseased and proper subject for
such treatment. '32 Later, the Court in Robinson v. California
emphatically affirmed this characterization by holding uncon-
stitutional a California penal statute making addiction a con-
tinuing offense. 3 Analogizing the punishment of addiction to
punishment for being a leper, the Court accepted that addic-
legal and financial liability or because they lack the services necessary to meet the
special needs of pregnant women.")
29. Paltrow, supra note 24, at 86.
30. SPECIAL DELIVERY NEWSLETTER, supra note 25 (listing the "fear that their chil-
dren will be taken away" as a major barrier for women seeking treatment).
31. ASSOCIATION OF MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH, STATEMENT SUBMITTED TO
THE SENATE FINANCE COMM. CONCERNING VICTIMS OF DRUG ABUSE (1990) [hereinafter
AMCH]; for similar statements, see also MARCH OF DIMES, STATEMENT ON MATERNAL
SUBSTANCE ABUSE (1990) [hereinafter MARCH OF DIMES]; NATIONAL ASS'N FOR PER-
INATAL ADDICTION RESEARCH AND EDUCATION, NAPARE POLICY STATEMENT No. 1,
CRIMINALIZATION OF PRENATAL DRUG USE: PUNITIVE MEASURES WILL BE COUNTER-
PRODUCTIVE (1990) [hereinafter NAPARE]; AMERICAN SOCIETY OF ADDICTION
MEDICINE, INC., PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT ON CHEMICALLY DEPENDENT WOMEN AND
PREGNANCY (1989) [hereinafter ASAM]; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON ALCOHOLISM AND
DRUG DEPENDENCE, POLICY STATEMENT, WOMEN, ALCOHOL, OTHER DRUGS, AND PREG-
NANCY (1990) [hereinafter NCADD].
32. 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1924).
33. 370 U.S. 660 (1961).
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tion "is apparently an illness which may be contracted inno-
cently or involuntarily.13 4
II. CURRENT TREND IN POLICY
The states have taken a variety of approaches. Education,
voluntary treatment, and other low-key responses have all been
attempted.35 Growth in research and service efforts continues.
A new, more aggressive policy, however, has come to the fore-
front. The new approach, in which individual prosecutors ac-
tively utilize the power of the state to compel treatment even in
the absence of a statewide mandate, has included such policies
as involuntary civil commitment and criminal prosecution of
pregnant women.
A. Criminalization Of The Issue
In searching for governmental solutions to maternal drug
use, the use of criminal prosecution stands on the vanguard.
Criminal programs operate on several different levels. The first
level is seen in Charleston, South Carolina, where prosecution
has been used to "add some teeth to our counseling efforts."36
There, women testing positive during screening are given an ul-
timatum: attend and complete treatment or be arrested. On a
second level, proponents of punitive policies contend that prose-
cutions also have a deterrent effect.3 7 On the final level, incar-
ceration may be used to "force an incarcerated or detained wo-
34. Id. at 667.
35. For example, cigarettes and alcohol products carry warnings for pregnant
women. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a). See CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 11757.55, 11757.59
(Deering 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1-203, 25-1-214 (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 17a-636, 17a-644 (1992); GA. CODE ANN. 8 26-5-5 (1994); ILL REV. STAT. ch. 20,
para 301/5-10 (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1, 161 (1994); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 222.021 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2514 (West 1993); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 191.725, 191.727 (1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 430.910 (1994); 71 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 553 (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-12.3-3 (1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-
23B-1 (1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-24-104 (1994); Wis. STAT. § 46.86 (1994).
36. Drug Testing Leads to Complaint, CHARLESTON NEWS & COURIER, Jan. 21,
1994, at B1, B4 (discussing testing program for pregnant women).
37. Most medical associations have concluded that deterrence is ineffective at curb-
ing chemical dependency. AMCH, supra note 31 (observing that "addiction is an illness
and has been shown to persist despite adverse consequences. . . .There is no evidence that
criminal prosecutions will deter alcohol or drug use during pregnancy."); MARCH OF
DIMs, supra note 31 (stating that "[a]ddiction is an illness and there is no evidence cur-
rently available to demonstrate that the threat of criminalization will deter addictive
behavior.").
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man to adopt behavior that would promote the health of her
fetus."3 8 In practice, criminalization policies typically rely on
all three rationales.
Regardless of the obstensibility of these rationales,
criminalization policies share a common orientation. They cre-
ate a "climate in which the fetus and the pregnant woman are
legal adversaries from the moment of conception until birth."39
Such policies foster a confrontational approach between the
mother and the fetus that has been aptly referred to as "a box-
ing match between a woman and her child." 40
A variety of statutes have been used to define the bounds
of this boxing match. Although ideally, a separate legislative
pronouncement should be addressed specifically to such mater-
nal conduct, the vast majority of policies simply employ ex-
isting statutes. Simple possession is the unsurprising foundation
for many local criminalization policies.41 Given that simple pos-
session clearly applies regardless of whether a woman is preg-
nant, application is unencumbered. Distribution to a minor is
another common approach in which the essence of the actus
reus involves passage of cocaine metabolites through the umbil-
ical cord, although states may differ as to the actual timing of
the offense.42 Still more colorful charges include "child abuse
or endangerment" and neglect of a dependent.43
38. Cole, supra note 3, at 2667.
39. 3 STATE COUNCIL ON MATERNAL, INFANT AND CHILD HEALTH CARE, OFFICE OF
THE GOVERNOR OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1991 SouTH CAROLINA STUDY OF DRUG USE
AMONG WOMEN GIVING BIRTH (1992) [hereinafter MICH 3 Study].
40. Interviews with Ms. Lynn M. Paltrow, Director of Special Litigation for the
Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, New York, New York (May-June 1993).
41. MICH 3 Study, supra note 39, at 26; see infra note 91 and accompanying text.
42. Paltrow, supra note 24, at 88. States and policies differ with regard to the timing
of the offense. Some policies charge the offense as occurring prior to birth (citing Declara-
tion of Barry Zuckerman, M.D., Ferguson v. Charleston, No. 2-93-2624-2 (D.S.C. filed
Oct. 5, 1993). Others make the timing of the offense identical to the time of birth. See
Paltrow, supra note 24, at 88 (citing Florida v. Johnson, No. E89-890-CFA (Fla. Cir. Ct.
July 13, 1989), affid, 602 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 1992)). By defining the actus reus as occurring
in the moment after birth, yet before the umbilical cord is severed, the state is able to avoid
the controversy of whether the unborn child is a minor.
43. Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: the Case Against the Criminalization
of 'Fetus Abuse,' 101 HARV. L. REv. 994, 1006 (1988) [hereinafter Maternal Rights]. See
also MICH 3 Study, supra note 39, at 25, 27.
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B. Sample Policy Illustrative of Current Trend44
Criminalization policies targeting pregnant women may
orbit a successful patient screening procedure. The Charleston,
South Carolina policy, used as a model for this Note, illustrates
the central role that the health care provider can play in such
policies. As a routine background matter, prenatal medical in-
terviews already inquire into the drug use habits of the mother.
Those women responding affirmatively to these queries are re-
ported to the authorities. By exploiting the confidences revealed
to the health care provider, interested prosecutors assure them-
selves of a steady stream of subjects.
Women who do not admit drug use to their physician may
still run afoul of the policy. Blood tests and Urine Drug
Screens (UDS) are often performed without express notice to
the patient.45 Authority for performing these tests may be pre-
mised on implied consent.46 The standard blanket consent for
treatment also provides the authorities for the doctor to "test
44. The Charleston "Interagency Policy" is used as a model for the purposes of this
Note. See MICH 3 Study, supra note 39, at 25-26. The MICH 3 Study provides a vignette
of the Charleston "Interagency Policy" typical of punitive approaches. Id.
The Charleston Solicitor's Office has described the policy as a mechanism for
coordination between law enforcement, the Department of Social Services, the
Medical University of South Carolina, the Charleston County Substance Abuse
Commission, and the Solicitor's Office. Women at risk for drug abuse are identi-
fied by a drug screen at the Medical University Obstetrical Clinic. Consent for
this urine screen is included in the consent for medical treatment that must be
signed by all patients seeking treatment at the clinic. Drug screens are performed
on patients who exhibit one of six 'clinical indicators' of drug use. If a woman
tests positive for cocaine use, she is shown a film on the danger of drug use during
pregnancy and offered immunity from prosecution if she accepts a referral to the
Substance Abuse Commission, successfully completes a rehabilitation program,
maintains negative urine tests, and continues prenatal care. Failure at any of these
conditions results in arrest.
Id.
45. In many cases, the decision about which patients to screen is based on protocol
factors. Such screenings may identify and test factors such as signs of abruptio placentae,
or late or non-existent prenatal care. Unfortunately, the discretion granted to health care
providers as to which patients to test often leads to racially biased policy applications. In
fact, the APHA found national surveys of prosecutions "indicate that women of color and
low-income women are disproportionately affected by punitive measures." APHA, supra
note 2, at 240; see Edgar 0. Horger III et al., Cocaine in Pregnancy: Confronting the
Problem, 86 J. S.C. MED. Ass'N 528 (1990) (noting the protocol adopted for use as an
indicator of possible drug use).
46. MICH 3 Study, supra note 39, at 35 (suggesting that consent can be inferred
from a patient's physical cooperation).
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for drugs if deemed advisable."4 Upon the completion of test-
ing, positive results are then disclosed to authorities.
After notification is received by the prosecutor's office, the
police department, or both, patients are then confronted with
the options available under the program. Owing to the lower
cost of outpatient care and the reduced legal burdens, patients
are often afforded the chance to seek treatment voluntarily. In
Charleston, women were provided with a photocopied state-
ment from the prosecutor informing them that they could enter
the program voluntarily and submit to future drug screenings.4 s
The statement further detailed, however, that failure to enter
treatment voluntarily would result in their immediate arrest
and prosecution.49
For those women electing to enter the program voluntarily,
subsequent positive drug screens create serious legal problems.
The original offense that is waived by the prosecutor upon en-
tering the program is reinstated and coupled with the current,
second offense. Arrested patients face jail time before and/or
after delivery, depending on the timing of their second positive
result. "Some women have been arrested and jailed while still
pregnant, brought to the hospital in shackles to deliver, and
then returned immediately to jail. Other women have been
taken from their hospital beds days or even hours after
delivery."'50
The timing of the subsequent positive tests also affects the
statutory violations charged. The most common policy frame-
work involves a sliding scale of offenses. As the delivery date
47. See the Medical University of South Carolina Authorization for Release of Med-
ical Information and Consent for Medical Treatment Form [hereinafter Blanket Consent]
which states in pertinent part:
"CONSENT FOR MEDICAL TREATEMENT - I acknowledge that I am suf-
fering from a condition requiring Medical/Hospital care and thereby voluntarily
consent to such Medical/Hospital care encompassing diagnostic procedures and
medical treatment by my physician . . . as may be necessary in his or her judg-
ment. I further consent to the testing of drugs if deemed advisable by my
physician."
(emphasis added).
48. MICH 3 Study, supra note 39, at 26.
49. Id.
50. The Center for Reproductive Law & Policy (New York, New York), Press Re-
lease, regarding the filing of Ferguson v. Charleston, No. 2-93-2624-2 (D.S.C. filed Oct. 5,
1993). Richard Green, Women Challenge Drug-use Prosecution, CHARLESTON NEWS &
COURIER, Oct. 6, 1993 (quoting Susan K. Dunn's view that "this policy is turning a hospi-
tal room into a jail room").
1995]
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nears, the number of charges increases. For instance, drug use
during the early days of pregnancy may result in charges of
simple possession. During the middle trimester of the term, a
second positive test results in charges of simple possession as
well as distribution of drugs to a minor. Should testing indicate
drug use in the weeks immediately before birth, child neglect
or endangerment are often included with the other charges. 51
Regardless of the timing, criminalization policies almost
universally refer the case to child welfare representatives. 52 The
newborn seldom returns home when the woman is labeled as an
addicted mother. Separated at birth from the mother, the child
is placed in foster care. Besides the prospect of criminal
charges, the woman must then attempt to utilize the family
court system to regain custody of her child.
III. MEDICAL EFFICACY
Due to the paucity of statistical data, little concrete evi-
dence exists to show that intrauterine cocaine exposure equals
"harm" to the fetus.5" In one study, less than half of the neo-
nates exposed to cocaine demonstrated immediate effects of
that exposure at birth.54 However, current studies display sta-
tistical shortcomings. Since cocaine users quite frequently also
use other illicit drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco, isolating
the effects of cocaine is nearly impossible. Similarly, other en-
vironmental factors, such as poor maternal nutrition and lack
of prenatal care in test subjects, exacerbate the statistical
shortcomings. 58 Thus, without further studies, a solid scientific
basis for assessing the scope of the medical risks to the fetus
remains lacking.
51. Maternal Rights, supra note 43, at 995-98, 1004-12.
52. MICH 3 Study, supra note 39, at 26 (referring to programs in Greenville and
Charleston, South Carolina).
53. Even assuming a conclusive demonstration of harm, it is unclear that cocaine
exposure poses any greater risk to the fetus than exposure to alcohol, a drug not typically
criminalized under such policies. See Declaration of Barry Zuckerman, supra note 42, at
7-8.
54. Chasnoff, supra note 4, at 1567.
55. MICH 3 Study, supra note 39, at 13-14 (citing multiple drug use and other
confounding factors).
56. Chasnoff, supra note 4, at 1568. "Lack of prenatal care among the drug using
women was a major and significant factor in neonatal costs in the Phibbs et al. study." See
Ciaron S. Phibbs et al., The Neonatal Costs of Maternal Cocaine Use, 266 JAMA 1521
(1991).
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Criminalization policies have raised both consternation
and concern among members of the medical community. By
relying on physicians to disclose the confidential statements and
test results of their patients, the state effectively "deputiz[es]
doctors to be police informers. ' 57 This extension of the doctor's
role has been criticized on several grounds. Most significantly,
commentators note that total candor must be encouraged, for
physicians cannot effectively operate on incomplete knowl-
edge.58 The court in Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty and Surety
Co. embraced this rationale stating that "[m]odern public pol-
icy, not the archaic whims of the common law, demands that
doctors obey their implied promise of secrecy."'5 9 This sound
public policy also finds a second level of support in the Hippo-
cratic Oath's restriction of the physician's ability to disclose in-
formation.6" Finally, on a more sinister level, NAPARE re-
ported studies suggesting prejudicial selectivity in disclosure
and revealing that despite the fact that black and white women
had similar rates of substance abuse, black women were re-
ported at approximately ten times the rate of white women."" l
These concerns have prompted a cacophony of dismay
from medical societies and commentators at any suggestion of
compromise. The American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists flatly stated that considering concerns for the preg-
nant woman's autonomy and preservation of the physician-pa-
tient relationship, "resort to the courts is almost never
justified" in order to compel treatment. 2 Similarly, both
ASAM and NAPARE recommended against such a role for
57. Paltrow, supra note 24, at 87.
58. See Hammonds v. Aetna Casaulty and Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio
1965).
59. Id. at 795.
60. Id. The court quoted the Hippcratic Oath in part: "Whatever in connection with
my professional practice or not in connection with it I see or hear in the life of men which
ought not to be spoken abroad I will not divulge as recommending that all such should be
kept secret." Id. at 797.
61. NAPARE, supra note 31 (recommending against an investigatory rule for
physicians).
62. COMM. ON ETHICS, AMERCIAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLO-
GISTS, OPINION No. 55, PATIENT CHOICE: MATERNAL-FETAL CONFLICT (Oct. 1987). The
Committee went on to add that, "Furthermore, inappropriate reliance on judicial authority
to implement treatment regimens in order to protect the fetus may lead to undesirable
societal consequences, such as the criminalization of non-compliance with medical recom-
mendations." Id.
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investigatorial physicians."3 NAPARE ominously forewarned
that placing health care providers in a conflicting position in
which they must choose between legal and ethical duties of
confidentiality would create a climate that many would find
professionally "intolerable."6
Perhaps still more disturbing is the probable adverse effect
of such policies on both maternal and fetal health. The pros-
pect of punitive measures often succeeds only in driving preg-
nant women out of the health care system entirely. 5 The most
obvious deterrent is the fear of prosecution. Additionally, the
Southern Regional Project on Infant Mortality reported that
among women desirous of treatment, one of the "major barri-
ers reported by women [was] fear [that] their children would
be taken away. ' Even voluntary admission to treatment often
necessitates relinquishing child custody since programs rarely
accommodate dependent children.67
On a more subtle level, punitive measures also operate to
undermine the resolve of women considering treatment. Wendy
Chavkin, in the Journal of the American Medical Association
stated that punitive measures serve to emphasize the guilt and
shame already experienced by addicted pregnant women.68 One
study even reported that "42% [of women surveyed] said that
guilt and shame over their drug use was their principal reason
for avoiding prenatal care."6 9
The results of punitive policies coupled with compelled
treatment programs appear, at best, lackluster. No scientific
evidence suggests that prosecution policies have improved fetal
health. 0 In fact, in the JAMA "Law and Medicine/Board of
Trustees Report," Helen Cole observed that "incarcerating
63. ASAM, supra note 31, at 1; NAPARE, supra note 31, at 1.
64. NAPARE, supra note 31, at 1.
65. MARCH OF DIMES, supra note 31 (advancing the position that "[flear of punish-
ment may cause women most in need of prenatal services to avoid health care profession-
als."). See also Maternal Rights, supra note 43, at 1011 (advocating an educational ap-
proach over criminalizing maternal conduct).
66. SPECIAL DELIVERY NEWSLETTER, supra note 25.
67. Paltrow, supra note 24, at 86 (stating "other programs effectively preclude
women because they fail to provide child care").
68. Wendy Chavkin, Mandatory Treatment for Drug Use During Pregnancy, 266
JAMA 1556, 1559 (1991).
69. Id.
70. PEDIATRICS, supra note 2, at 641 (finding that punitive measures such as incar-
ceration have no proven benefits for infant health). See also Chavldn, supra note 68, at
1560.
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pregnant women in order to preserve fetal health may prove
counterproductive. 7 1 This adverse effect can be attributed to
several causes. Incarcerated women face poor prison nutrition,
poor sanitary conditions, and medical facilities that leave much
room for improvement. 2
Even for those women not incarcerated, the mere threat of
incarceration can be a deterrent to seeking prenatal care. The
ASAM Policy Statement on punitive measures concluded that
"[c]riminal prosecution of chemically dependent women will
have the overall result of deterring such women from seeking
both prenatal care and chemical dependency treatment,
thereby increasing, rather than preventing, harm to children
and society as a whole."17 3 This conclusion was buttressed by
GAO surveys indicating that such policies increase the likeli-
hood of women delivering at home and thus avoiding prenatal
care altogether. 4 Given that evidence suggests that prenatal
care may be more important than maternal drug use in deter-
mining fetal health, punitive approaches appear to do more
harm than good.
Punitive policies combined with compulsory drug treat-
ment also have an adverse effect on success with drug abuse
counseling. As previously noted, guilt and shame are a primary
reason why women fail to seek treatment.7 5 As blame and
stigma are increased, the woman's resolve to seek treatment is
further undermined. 6 Yet, personal resolve and a degree of
self-esteem are essential to successful recovery. At least one
study has demonstrated that female addicts compelled into
treatment were less likely to remain in treatment than volun-
tary entrants.77 Thus, there appears to be some credibility to
the truism that, "One can compel attendance, but not meaning-
ful participation."7 8
Unquestionably, these results from a medical perspective
are less than stellar. The punitive approach, flawed as a device
71. Cole, supra note 3, at 2667.
72. Id.
73. ASAM, supra note 31, at 47-49.
74. See GAO STUDY, supra note 18.
75. Chavldn, supra note 68, at 1559.
76. Telephone Interview with Susan K. Dunn, Esq., Co-counsel for Plaintiff, Fergu-
son v. Charleston, No. 2-93-2624-2 (D.S.C. filed Oct. 5, 1993).
77. Chavkin, supra note 68, at 1557.
78. Id.
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to improve maternal and fetal health, may have the ironic con-
sequence of encouraging abortion.79 Under a number of poli-
cies, there is no prosecution unless there is a child involved. 80
Given the scarcity of adequate treatment options, women may
be effectively encouraged to seek abortions.8"
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. General Problems
Regardless of the medical efficacy of the current punitive
trend, serious legal obstacles confront such policies. On the
most basic level, the characterization of addiction as a "dis-
ease" in Robinson v. California8 raises the specter of punish-
ing involuntary physical conditions and immutable traits. Al-
though the Court accepted that "use" may be criminal, it
found punishment for the illness of addiction to impugn the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.88 Analogizing to other in-
voluntary physical ailments, the Court lamented that "[e]ven
one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for
the crime of having a common cold."84
A second fundamental problem with a punitive approach
regards the slippery slope encountered in defining the actus
reus. Is the culpable conduct under such policies drug use, be-
ing pregnant, or delivering the child? While the answer might
appear obvious, the State of Florida calls it into question. In
the closing arguments of Florida v Johnson, "the prosecutor
made clear that Johnson's real crime was not the delivery of
79. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
80. Id.
81. Cole, supra note 3, at 2677; Commonwealth v. Pelligrini, No. 87970, slip op. at 9
(Mass. Super. Ct., Oct. 15, 1990) (noting "the state's interest [in preserving life] would be
further undermined when women seek to terminate their pregnancies for fear of criminal
sanctions.").
82. 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1961). The Court stated that "narcotic addiction is an illness.
Indeed, it is an apparently an illness which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily."
Id. (citing the brief written by the state). This type of questioning of the "voluntariness"
has not been isolated. "Thus, [h]owever the initial use of a drug might be characterized, its
continued use by addicts is rarely, if ever, truly voluntary." Wendy K. Mariner et al.,
Pregnancy, Drugs and the Perils of Prosecution, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETmcs 30, 36 (1990); See
also Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1924) (stating addicts are "diseased and
proper subjects for such treatment.")
83. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666 (analogizing the criminalization of addiction to the
criminalization of mental illness, leprosy, or venereal disease).
84. Id. at 667.
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drugs, but the delivery of her child: 'When she delivered that
baby, she broke the law in the State."' 85
The selective application of punitive policies to pregnant
women virtually condemns the state to wrestle on this slippery
slope. Without question, drug use, possession, and distribution
statutes apply to the public at large and not merely to pregnant
women. But enforcement and testing policies single out preg-
nant women seeking prenatal care as the recipients of increased
testing and enforcement. Thus, regardless of the definition of
the actus reus, punishment remains inextricably linked to preg-
nancy. The fundamental nature of reproductive autonomy
rights suggests that such a link is unconstitutional.88
Even excluding the act or element of pregnancy, consider-
able difficulty remains in defining the criminal act. A variety of
acts have been shown to have a detrimental effect on fetal
health. Smoking, alcohol consumption, excessive exercise, and
vigorous sexual intercourse all have been shown to endanger
fetal health to some extent.87 With the only available evidence
suggesting that 50% of cocaine-exposed infants show effects at
birth, cocaine may not be scientifically demonstrated to present
a more compelling level of "harm."88 Without a distinguishing
feature, the criminalization (on grounds of fetal protection) of
cocaine use alone may be sufficiently underinclusive as to raise
equal protection problems as well. 89
85. Paltrow, supra note 24 (citing Trial Transcript at 365, 367, Florida v. Johnson,
No. E-89-890-CFA (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 13, 1989), affid Johnson v. State, 602 So.2d 1288
(Fla. 1992)). "The court agreed with this formulation of the 'crime,' noting that Jennifer
Johnson 'made a choice to become pregnant and to allow those pregnancies to come to
term."' Paltrow, supra note 24, at n.25.
86. See generally Cleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFluer, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (rec-
ognizing that overly restrictive maternity leave regulations can constitute a heavy burden
on the exercise of protected freedoms); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (concluding that
the right to privacy protects personal decisions regarding abortion); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding that a statutory prohibition on contraception intrudes
upon right of marital privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (finding that a
statutory prohibition on contraceptive use by unmarried persons conflicts with certain fun-
damental rights).
87. See Paltrow, supra note 24, at 88. Other less obvious activities also exposing the
fetus to risk include "expos[ing] the fetus to health risks by flying to Europe or cleaning
[a] cat's litter box." Id. See Chasnoff, supra note 4 (noting that alcohol and tobacco expo-
sure also pose fetal health risks); See MICH 3 Study, supra note 39, at 20-21.
88. Chasnoff, supra note 4, at 1567-68.
89. This is not to suggest that there may not be grounds for punishment for the
woman's cocaine use. The argument is that the policy is severely underinclusive. Even if
the drug statutes apply equally to all citizens, under punitive policies, only pregnant women
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The most perplexing of the fundamental problems associ-
ated with punitive policies involves the hierarchy of punish-
ments for offenses. Oftentimes, the level of punishment in-
creases as the date of delivery nears.90 This scheme has been
questioned under at least two rationales. The first rationale is
are tested for cocaine use upon hospital admission. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886) (holding that the city ordinance regarding fire safety denied equal protection when
applied disproportionately against Chinese immigrants). Further, the emphasis on cocaine
abuse is severely underinclusive since cocaine has not been demonstrated to have a more
severe fetal impact than other drugs such as alcohol, nicotine, or heroin. While underinclu-
sive statutes might normally survive Constitutional review, policies with a discriminatory
intent face greater challenge. See New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568
(1979) (upholding the New York Transit Authority policy against hiring users of metha-
done despite the fact that it was overinclusive since not all methadone users were danger-
ous). In this case, the policies only apply to pregnant women. The punitive policies focusing
on cocaine use by women also disproportionately snare African-Americans. Studies have
shown that blacks are appreciably more likely to use cocaine than whites, even given that
overall drug use is relatively equal across race. MICH 1 study, supra note 10, at 25. In this
light, the concerns aired in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), again become
poignant. In Skinner, the Court found a state law requiring sterilization of habitual
criminals to be unconstitutional due to its violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at
538.
The Supreme Court in Wayte v. U.S., 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985), made clear that
discriminatory effect alone is not enough to support selective enforcement arguments. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (requiring discriminatory intent in addi-
tion to disparate impact). However, as demonstrated in Yick Wo, when the disparate im-
pact is so gross as to not be rationally explainable on neutral grounds, intent can be in-
ferred. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74.
In Wayte both the majority and the dissenting opinions view the three factors enunci-
ated in Catsteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977), as sufficient to establish both
discriminatory intent and effect. To prevail, the individual must show "[f]irst that he is a
member of a distinct and recognizable class. Second, he must show that a disproportionate
number of this class were selected for ... possible prosecution. Third, he must show that
his selection procedure was subject to abuse or otherwise not neutral." Id. at 626 (J. Mar-
shall, dissenting).
Pregnant women and African-Americans are clearly members of a distinct class. Sta-
tistics on relative drug use by race shows that the underinclusive scheme, even at its best,
would single out African-Americans. In fact, the complaint filed in Charleston, South Car-
olina alleged that the women pursued under the policy were "virtually all African-Amer-
cian." Drug Testing Leads to Complaint, CHARLESTON NEws & COURIER, Jan. 21, 1994,
at BI, B4. Finally, the selection standards for testing only applied to pregnant women. The
testing for cocaine instead of "all drugs" virtually assured a racially skewed result given
the statistical data of the MICH study. MICH I Study, supra note 10, at 7 (stating that
African-American women are six times more likely than Caucasion women to use cocaine).
90. See Maternal Rights, supra note 43, at 998; Plaintiff's Ex. No. 5, Ferguson v.
Charleston, No. 2-93-2624-2 (D.S.C. filed Oct. 5, 1993) stating in pertinent part:
"3. CHARGES TO BE FILED The following criminal charges will be filed
against arrestees: (a) if the pregnancy is 27 weeks or less - Possession .... (b) if
the pregnancy is 28 weeks or more - Possession AND Distribution to persons
under eighteen. (c) if the patient delivers while testing positive ... Unlawful neg-
lect of a child."
(Exhibit on file with author).
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found in the concurring opinion of Judge Reilly in People v.
Hardy9 l1 that focused on the unexpected nature of child deliv-
ery in general. He feared that criminalization based on use just
before delivery would be based on the "occurrence of a contin-
gency [labor] which is not within her control and is not reason-
ably anticipated at the time the drugs are used." Judge Reilly
concluded that to make the grade of the offense contingent on
such fortuitous events was unjust.9 2
The other problematic element of graduated punishment
schemes is their lack of correlation to the harm involved. There
is little question that the fetus is most vulnerable to deforma-
tion during the earliest stages of development.9 3 But graduated
punishment schemes provide the lowest level of punishment for
conduct during this high-risk period.94 This incongruous out-
come may result from a prosecutorial fixation on the Roe v.
Wade95 trimester framework. However, this attempt to avoid
the limitations on the state's interests (and the fetus' rights)
expounded by Roe may prove counterproductive. For although
the state's interests in potential life may increase during gesta-
tion, the deterrent diminishes as the danger increases.96
91. 469 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Mich. App. 1991).
92. Id.
93. Telephone Interview with Dr. William C. MacLean, Jr., Vice President of Pedi-
atric Nutritional Research and Development of Ross (Abbott) Laboratories (Mar. 30,
1994). The fetus faces the greatest risk of deformity during the early stages of pregnancy.
During the first stages, the fetus starts as a single cell which possesses all the genes for the
entire body. These cells must divide and then specialize. Thus, errors occurring in the earli-
est stages may be replicated. As the fetus develops, genes in certain cells are "turned on
and off" to differentiate into major organs, bones, and muscle. The further along the fetus
is in this process of differentiation, the less danger toxins pose to development. This sug-
gests that the risk of deformity stemming from exposure in the late stages of pregnancy is
lower than from exposure occurring in the first weeks.
However, there is a second type of risk. While fetuses exposed to drugs during the late
stages of pregnancy face lower risk of deformity, they may face an increased risk of carry-
over effects like withdrawal symptoms. Dr. McLean opined that while hard statistical evi-
dence documenting such a secondary risk may be elusive, experts in the field probably
would be willing to support the hypothesis on at least theoretical grounds.
94. See Maternal Rights, supra note 43, at 998.
95. 410 U.S. 113, 161-64 (1973). See also Maternal Rights, supra note 43, at 998.
96. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803 (1992),
appears to have dispensed with the Roe trimester framework by recognizing the state's
interest throughout the full term of pregnancy. Freed from the rigidity of Roe, the inverse
relation between punishment and risk to the fetus only becomes more perplexing.
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B. Statutory Interpretation in Light of the Concept of "Fair
Warning"
A common conception of due process is that statutes must
detail, with some specificity, exactly what conduct is forbidden.
The court in State v. Graham97 stated that a prohibition re-
quiring that "men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the
due process of law."98 Thus, constitutional concerns "prohibit
prosecutors from inventing new crimes and from interpreting
existing crimes in new, unforeseeable, and unintended ways."99
Even in instances where statutes fail to rise to the level of
due process or are constitutionally vague, courts have consist-
ently striven to preserve the concept of fair warning. 100 When
engaged in statutory interpretation, courts often balk at ex-
panding the meaning of statutes and words beyond their plain
meaning. This concern is particularly evident when the statute
or word in question has a long-established application or mean-
ing.101 Such unannounced alterations in a statute's application
would deprive even a well-informed reasonable person of
notice.
As illustrated in Keeler v. Superior Ct. of Amador
County, attempts to expand existing criminal statutes to in-
clude fetuses have encountered notice problems.102 The court
was asked to extend a homicide statute to include feticide. As
97. 480 N.E.2d 981 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
98. Id. at 987 (quoting Grady v. State, 278 N.E.2d 280, 281 (1972)).
99. Paltrow, supra note 42, at 88; MICH 3 Study, supra note 39, at 25-26.
100. While the ideal of fair warning is surely linked to constitutional vagueness argu-
ments, the two concepts are not co-extensive. Vagueness, as typically applied, refers only to
those statutes which have no clear meaning on their face. The more common instance in
which a court is asked to extend a statute with at least one clear meaning to a new, uncon-
templated application does not rise to the level of constitutional vagueness. In the latter
situation, the court is likely to refuse to extend the statute based on concerns of "fair
warning," but is not called on to strike the statute (as previously applied) as unconstitu-
tional. See generally Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 109 U.
PA. L. Rav. 67 (1960), reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITnONAL LAW 560, 574-
75 (Edward Barnett, Jr. et al. eds., 1963) (recounting United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S.
174 (1952) and United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948) as instances in which the
court refused to apply a statute it deemed as too ambiguous even though no constitutional
ground was cited).
101. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Ct. of Amador County, 470 P.2d 617, 622 (Cal.
1970) (holding that with respect to the application of a murder statute to abortion, the
legislature intended the word "person" not to include a fetus).
102. Id. at 626, 639 (citing Bowie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964)).
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previously applied, homicide required the death of a person.
After lengthy debate, the court concluded that a fetus was
outside the common conception of the term person and that ex-
tending the meaning of homicide would deprive the defendant
of fair warning. The court thus refused to allow the
conviction.10
The application of child neglect and drug delivery charges
in reference to an unborn fetus is plagued by the same con-
cerns. Plain reading of most of these statutes limits applicabil-
ity to "persons." Although statutes must be examined individu-
ally, typical wording describes conduct perpetrated against a
"child" or a "person. 10 4 Yet it is relatively evident that a "fe-
tus" does not meet the definition of a person. 10 5 Referring to
child endangerment and drug distribution charges stemming
from maternal drug use, the MICH Council stated that "[a]ll
courts considering the issue have held that statutes of this type
do not apply to drug use during pregnancy. 10 6
Thus, even if evidence can be marshaled against offending
women, fair warning concerns may restrain courts from apply-
ing existing penal statutes. The lack of applicability of most
existing laws, well-chronicled by the cases above, underscores
the need for specific legislative deliberation and drafting.0 7 In
cases of such profound public policy, the legislature, not the
prosecutor's office, is best designed to define the bounds of the
public good.
103. Id. at 630.
104. See MICH 3 Study, supra note 39, at 27-28.
105. In the abortion context, the fetus must have be viewed by the Court as being
distinct from a person, for otherwise the fetus' demise would be homicide. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-69; Planned Parenhood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2803 (1992).
106. MICH 3 Study, supra note 39, at 28 (citing to Reyes v. Superior Court, 75
Cal. App. 3d 214 (1977); People v. Stewart, No. M508097 (San Diego Mun. Ct., Feb. 23,
1987); Florida v. Ethel D. Carter, No. 89-6274, (Fla. Cir. Ct., Escambia Cty., July 23,
1990); State v. Gethers, No. 89-4454CF10A (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 1989); State v. Gray,
584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992); State v. Andrews, No. JU 68459 (Ohio C.P. June 19, 1989);
State v. Osmus, 276 P.2d 469 (Wyo. 1954)).
107. MICH 3 Study, supra note 39, at 3 (stating that "[i]f pre-birth intervention by
the Dept. of Social Services or another agency is regarded as desirable, new legislation
would be necessary to authorize and fund interventions specifically oriented toward
preventing prenatal harm.")
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V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS INVOLVED
A. Penumbral Privacy
Punitive policies necessarily encounter constitutional diffi-
culty surrounding rights of personal privacy. As Justice Doug-
las enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut, a "protected zone"
emanating from the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amend-
ments exists in which the individual's privacy is protected from
intrusion.108 Justice Goldberg's concurrance, relying on Justice
Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States,09 aptly re-
ferred to the "right to be let alone - the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."' 10 It is
within this "right to be let alone" that the rights surrounding
reproductive autonomy and bodily integrity are reposed - po-
tentially catastrophic hurdles for any punitive drug treatment
policy aimed at pregnant women.
1. The Right to Reproductive Autonomy
The federal judiciary has long endorsed a primarily lais-
s6z-faire approach towards regulation of "family planning" is-
sues. The origin of this approach can be seen as early as Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma in which the Court invalidated the Oklahoma
Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act."' In the initial sentence,
Justice Douglas characterized procreation as "a sensitive and
important area of human rights."" 2 Invalidating the statute
under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court emphasized that
"[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very exis-
tence and survival of the race.""13 Although the Skinner ration-
ale rested on Equal Protection grounds, subsequent cases in-
cluding Griswold v. Connecticut demonstrated the Court's due
process privacy commitment to attaining the same "hands off"
result.
The decision in Roe v. Wade grappled with the due pro-
cess quagmire of maternal versus fetal rights."" In Roe, the
108. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
109. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
110. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 494.
111. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
112. Id. at 536.
113. Id. at 541.
114. 410 U.S. 113, 150-51 (1973).
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Court concluded that the existence of the fetus did not alter the
nature of the woman's fundamental right. Rather, the Court
determined that any interest of the state in fetal rights must
properly be addressed through the strict scrutiny interest bal-
ancing framework.115 Recognizing that "[1]iberty finds no ref-
uge in the jurisprudence of doubt," Justice O'Connor's opinion
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey affirmed
Roe's protection of procreation, contraception, marriage, and
family.' 16 Significantly, she cautioned that "[b]eliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood
were they formed under compulsion of the State." The con-
cept of personal freedom regarding reproductive autonomy re-
mained triumphant, even if the court did concede that state in-
terests could predominate in certain limited circumstances. 1 8
Within this laiss6z-faire framework of reproductive pri-
vacy, the Court quickly signaled that government intrusion
need not be complete to offend. In Cleveland Board of Educa-
tion v. LaFleur,"19 the Court struck down a restrictive mater-
nity leave requirement. The Court concluded that disparate
treatment based only on the fact of pregnancy effectively
served to punish women for exercising their right to bear
children.12 0
Punitive policies plunge headlong into this morass of indi-
vidual rights by directly influencing decisions regarding preg-
nancy, abortion, and family planning. That such policies punish
pregnancy is hardly a novel conclusion. Dorothy Roberts, states
"[i]t is important to recognize . . . that the prosecutions are
based in part on a woman's pregnancy and not on her illegal
drug use alone."' 1 Roberts' opinion was well supported by the
115. Id.
116. 112 S. Ct. at 2803.
117. Id. at 2807 (emphasis added).
118. Id.
119. 414 U.S. 632, 651 (1974).
120. Id. at 640.
121. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1445 (1991) (stating
that "[i]t is the choice of carrying a pregnancy to term that is being penalized"). This
notion is underscored by the fact that in most instances, charges will be dropped if the
pregnancy is aborted. Also, as previously discussed, selective enforcement creates the bur-
den on reproductive rights. While drug use is criminal in general, only pregnant women are
subjected to the increased screening and enforcement under these policies. See Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). By singling out women on the basis of pregnancy,
the pregnancy in effect becomes a required element under these policies.
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cavalier statements in the Florida v. Johnson transcript pro-
claiming that "[w]hen she delivered that baby, she broke the
law in the State. 1 22
In evaluating the propriety of punitive drug approaches,
pregnant women are clearly isolated and given different treat-
ment - treatment that discourages pregnancy. Unable to envi-
sion an acceptable punitive plan, the MICH Council ultimately
concluded that the LaFleur analysis "would apply to require-
ments that medical confidentiality be breached, that ... crimi-
nal penalties be imposed, that drug testing be required.., for
pregnant women, if these same requirements would not apply
to a person who was similarly situated except for the fact of
pregnancy." 123
When applied to punitive policies, the LaFleur analysis of
indirect punishment of pregnancy is far surpassed. Upon deliv-
ery, punitive policies subject women to prosecution for charges
including simple possession, distribution to a minor, child en-
dangerment, and neglect of a dependent. 24 Criminal law does
not offer a clearer deterrent for conduct. Given the involuntary
nature of drug use in the context of addiction, what is truly
punished is pregnancy.
The alternatives facing women under such policies are
bleak. "Indeed, for a woman accused of prenatal child abuse,
the only option to avoid punitive measures may be an unwanted
abortion."1 25 Such government coercion was disparaged as
early as Skinner where the court feared that "[i]n evil or reck-
less hands, [control of reproduction] can cause races or types
which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and
disappear. '"28
In the current context, this fear may be well-founded. Pu-
nitive policies are commonly applied in indigent care facili-
122. Paltrow, supra note 24, at 88 (citing Florida v. Johnson, No. E89-890-CFA
(Fla. Cir. Ct. July 13, 1989), affd, 602 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 1992)).
123. MICH 3 Study, supra note 39, at 10.
124. Paltrow, supra note 24, at 88; MICH 3 Study, supra note 39, at 25; Plaintiff's
Ex. No. 5, supra note 90.
125. Paltrow, supra note 24, at 88; see also Roberts, supra note 121, at 1445 (stat-
ing that the woman is "penalized for choosing to have the baby rather than have an
abortion.")
126. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
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ties.127 Cocaine use tends to be higher among blacks than
whites, although both races display roughly equal usage of
drugs overall.128 At least one study has shown that physicians
are more likely to report women of color to the authorities.2 9
Protocol testing factors that leave the question of whom to test
largely to the discretion of nursing staffs likewise lead to ra-
cially-biased results. The gestalt of these factors is a policy in
which the impact is borne almost exclusively by lower income
women of color.
2. The Right to Bodily Integrity
Penumbral privacy also contains a right of bodily integ-
rity. This right to be free from bodily invasion originated in the
common law. The court in Norwood Hospital v. Munoz de-
clared that "individuals have a common law right to determine
for themselves whether to allow a physical invasion of their
bodies." 130 Thus, Judge Cardozo's maxim that "every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body" still echoes in court
decisions.131
Courts, not content to rest on common law foundations,
have investigated the existence of a constitutional basis for the
right to refuse medical treatment. With reference to Roe, Gris-
wold, and others, the court in In re Quinlan concluded that the
same constitutional right encompassing abortion also was broad
enough to "encompass a patient's decision to refuse medical
treatment.'13 2 Later cases such as Norwood confidently as-
serted that "[i]ndividuals also have a penumbral constitutional
right of privacy to reject medical treatment."' 33
127. See Ferguson v. Charleston, No. 2-93-2624-2 (D.S.C. filed Oct. 5, 1993) (stat-
ing that the Medical University of South Carolina was the only indigent care facility in the
area and was the only hospital in the area involved in the policy).
128. MICH 1 Study, supra note 10, at 6-8.
129. NAPARE, supra note 30, at 1.
130. 564 N.E.2d 1017, 1021 (Mass. 1991).
131. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914);
Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1019 (Md. 1977).
132. 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976).
133. Norwood, 564 N.E.2d at 1021; see also Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp.,
497 N.E.2d 626, 630 (Mass. 1986) (finding that right to refuse medical treatment arises
from common law and unwritten penumbral constitutional rights).
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Only recently, however, has the United States Supreme
Court entered the fray. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri De-
partment of Health, the Court carefully recounted the develop-
ment of both the common law and constitutional foundations
for the right to bodily integrity.134 In its schizophrenic journey,
the Court refused to definitively comment on the existence of a
constitutional basis.13 5 Stating "we think the logic of the cases
discussed above would embrace such a [constitutional] liberty
interest,"' 6 the decision then proceeded based on a hypotheti-
cal assumption that such a right might exist. The Court did,
however, resolve that the "Due Process Clause protects an in-
terest in life as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining
medical treatment.'13 7 It also emphatically acknowledged the
common law doctrine of informed consent. 3 8 Having discussed
the right to refuse treatment as the logical corollary of in-
formed consent, it appears the Court may have given both con-
cepts constitutional stature.
The doctrine of informed consent typically requires the
physician to disclose to the patient all relevant risks of the pro-
cedure unless they are statistically remote or of only minor se-
verity."3 9 These risks include "(1) the diagnosis, (2) the general
134. 497 U.S. 261, 269, 277 (1990).
135. Id. at 279. Unfortunately, the Court was not specific in resolving the basis for
the right. Justice Rehnquist recognized the popularizing influence of Quinlan for the con-
stitutional theory. Id. However, cases such as In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 858 (1981), in which the New York court refused to base its decision on grounds
of constitutional privacy, were also discussed approvingly. One possible explanation is that
while a majority supports the existence of such a constitutional right in this context, it
fears that recognition would open the door to arguments in the abortion context. Thus, the
Court's discussion of Quinlan and its progeny may display the court approaching accept-
ance of this new theory.
However, with the arrival of Casey, the Court's previously equivocal embrace of a
constitutional right to bodily integrity was solidified. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2810. Justice
O'Connor's opinion, ending debate on whether Roe and Griswold included a right of "bod-
ily integrity," cited Cruzan as resolving the question. Id. Office Interview with Prof. Melvin
Durchslag, Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Cleve-
land, Ohio (Mar. 9, 1994). See also Daniel Avila, Medical Treatment Rights of Older
Persons and Persons With Disabilities: 1991-92 Developments, 8 Iss. oF LAw & MED.
429, 436 (1993) (interpreting Casey's reference to Cruzan as an indication of the Court
shifting the grounds of its abortion decisions from the Griswold privacy right toward a
fundamental right of bodily integrity).
136. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
137. Id. at 280.
138. Id. at 270.
139. See Hook v. Rothstein, 316 S.E.2d 690, 703 (S.C. App. 1984) (stating that
"lt]he physician's chief concern when treating a patient should be the patient's best inter-
est.") Id. at 697.
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nature of the contemplated procedure, (3) the material risks
involved in the procedure, (4) the probability of success associ-
ated with the procedure, (5) the prognosis if the procedure is
not carried out, and (6) the existence of any alternatives to the
procedure."140
Covert drug testing and the related risk of prosecution em-
ployed by punitive policies faces serious legal obstacles unless
accompanied by consent.141 The risk of prosecution appears to
be within the Canterbury v. Spence conception of a "material
risk" that might "potentially affect the patient's decision. 142
Empirical evidence supports that women view the risk of prose-
cution as material. Fear of prosecution has been cited as a ma-
jor reason for women avoiding prenatal care.14 This same fear
prompted the GAO's prediction that punitive policies would re-
sult in more women delivering at home to avoid detection. 44
Drug testing under punitive policies notably lacks any
form of consent. Implied consent, based on the patient's cooper-
ation, cannot be relied upon when the patient is unaware that
the procedure is being performed. There must be some appreci-
ation of the risks and the procedures for which the implied con-
sent is given.1 45 Thus, "it could not be implied that a pregnant
woman had consented to a drug screen which would be re-
ported to authorities ... merely by consenting to an otherwise
'routine' blood test. 1 46
Defending of punitive policies, proponents often futilely
proffer the "blanket consent" signed by the patient upon ad-
mission. Courts considering express consent, however, have
consistently disregarded such "blanket" statements. As stated
in Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, consent must be "unequivo-
140. Id. at 694.
141. MICH 3 Study, supra note 39, at 36 (stating that "[m]edical testing resulting
in potential criminal prosecution or other action by the state should clearly be performed
only with the express consent of the patient.")
142. 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
143. See Cole, supra note 3, at 2667; see also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
144. GAO STUDY, supra note 18, at 9-10.
145. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976) (stat-
ing informed consent for abortion requires decisions be made "with full knowledge of its
nature and consequences. The woman is the one primarily concerned, and her awareness of
the decision and its consequences, may be assured, constitutionally, by the State.").
146. See MICH 3 Study, supra note 39, at 36.
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cal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any du-
ress or coercion. 14
Under the Feliciano formulation, every aspect of valid
consent is lacking. "Intelligent" consent is unlikely when the
patient is neither informed that the test will be performed nor
told of the material risks. The "blanket consent," by its very
nature, precludes any argument of "specificity." Finally, the
"medical judgment" provisions in the blanket consent make it
equivocal at best when employed for law enforcement rather
than medicine.
Likewise consent gained upon confrontation by the author-
ities is also invalid. The court in United States v. Lopez empha-
sized that consent is not voluntary if it is the "product of duress
or coercion, actual or implicit."1 8 When presented with a
choice between prosecution or entry into a "treatment" requir-
ing random drug testing, patients can hardly be viewed as un-
pressured actors. Any consent given to future drug testing can
only be viewed as tainted.
B. The Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure
The Fourth Amendment secures for every citizen the right
to be free of "unreasonable searches and seizures" of their
"persons, houses, papers, and effects. 1 49 Non-consensual drug
testing and subsequent disclosure of results, relied on by puni-
tive policies, violates the Fourth Amendment. The Court in
Mapp v. Ohio decried the use of evidence obtained in illegal
searches and declared that "invasion of [a subject's] indefeasi-
ble right of personal security [or] any forcible and compulsory
extortion of a man's own testimony"1150 is within the condemna-
tion of the Bill of Rights. Recognizing that what constituted a
reasonable search could not be gauged by reference to a rigid
147. 661 F. Supp. 578, 594 (N.D.Ohio 1987) (citing to United States v. Williams,
754 F.2d 672, 674 (6th Cir. 1985)). See also United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077,
1092 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (requiring "voluntary" consent be "unequivocal, specific, and intel-
ligently given").
148. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1092.
149. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
150. 367 U.S. 643, 647 (1961) (finding that blood taken over the petitioner's objec-
tion by his physician while petitioner was in the hospital did not constitute a violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights).
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formula, the Court suggested that it must be established on an
ad hoc basis.1 51
The privacy of the home examined in Mapp, however,
pales in importance when compared to the privacy of the per-
son. Just five years after the Mapp decision, the Supreme
Court addressed the issue directly in Schmerber v. Califor-
nia. 1 2 Considering the blood and alcohol testing of a drunk
driving arrestee, the Court was convinced that the test was
clearly a Fourth Amendment search. 53 The Court then opined
that "the Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain
not all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not
justified in the circumstances."1 54 While the test was found to
be reasonable on the facts of the case, the Court emphasized
that it condoned only "minor intrusions into an individual's
body under stringently limited conditions" and emphasized that
courts would not tolerate further expansion. 55
The analysis of Fourth Amendment cases is relatively
straightforward. The Supreme Court first considers whether
the test was administered by the agents of the government. 56
Addressed next is the issue of whether the test "constitutes a
search or seizure by infringing a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy. ' 157 Only with both questions answered in the affirmative
will the court then turn to the reasonableness of the challenged
conduct.' 58
The numerous factors relevant to the reasonableness deter-
mination essentially require an ad hoc review of the record. Fe-
liciano concentrated on the existence of probable cause to jus-
tify the search as well as the nature of the search.159 The Court
strongly rejected arguments that drug testing might fall within
151. Id. at 653.
152. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
153. Id. at 767.
154. Id. at 768.
155. Id. at 772. Later cases have affirmed that drug testing constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search. See, e.g., Feliciano, 661 F. Supp. at 584 (finding that "[b]ased upon
the weight of the precedent holding that urinalysis is a [F]ourth [A]mendment search or
seizure, numerous courts have simply adopted a holding without independent analysis.")
156. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989)
(upholding that drug testing of railroad workers is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment).
157. Feliciano, 661 F. Supp. at 583.
158. Id.; see Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614.
159. Feliciano, 661 F. Supp. at 5845.
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the scope of de minimus intrusions such as fingerprinting.1 60 In-
terpreting Schmerber16' through the lens of both Mara"1 2 and
Davis,16 3 the Feliciano court found a distinction between "in-
trusions involv[ing] physical characteristics that are 'constantly
exposed to the public' and those "probing into an individual's
private life and thoughts.""" In the absence of consent or a
warrant, the Court noted that such intrusions of the person
must be accompanied by probable cause.1 5
Given that UDS tests performed under punitive policies
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, the inquiry
then turns to the issue of government involvement. Admittedly,
testing under such policies is conducted by health care profes-
sionals rather than by the police. In context, however, the clini-
cians effectively assume the role of deputized police
informers."
The Charleston policy provides an ideal illustration. The
UDS testing was performed at the request of the Solicitor's Of-
fice.1 17 Results were then disclosed to the police and the Solici-
tor. The Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) was
an official member of the "interagency" policy group. Appear-
ances of agency were further enhanced by the active counseling
role played by physicians. First, physicians would confront the
patient and present her with a notice letter signed by the Solic-
itor. Next, they would show her a film on the dangers of drug
160. Id.
161. Sohmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (stating "[in the absence of a
clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human inter-
ests [of privacy] require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence will disappear"
and thus constrains them from conducting a search).
162. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973) (finding that a handwriting
sample taken is not a search since handwriting is continuously exhibited in public).
163. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (holding that fingerprinting ar-
restees does not amount to "search").
164. Feliciano, 661 F. Supp. at 585.
165. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
166. Courts have displayed hesitance in accepting evidence obtained in a search by a
private party. See Gundlach v. Janing, 401 F. Supp. 1089, 1092-94 (D. Neb. 1975) (ex-
plaining that the policy against receiving such evidence was grounded in discouraging offi-
cials from participating in or encouraging searches conducted by private parties on behalf
of the government). See also Water v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (limiting
the scope of the government's ability to further investigate articles obtained through a pri-
vate party search).
167. Letter from Charles Condon, Solicitor, South Carolina Office of the Solicitor
General (Oct. 18, 1989) (stating that positive test results were being forwarded to the
soliciter's office pursuant to an interagency policy) (on file with the author).
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use, also provided by the Solicitor. Finally, they would secure
the patient's signature on a contract to get treatment to avoid
prosecution. All of these steps were performed for the benefit
and under the control of the sovereign.' 68
The drug screenings employed by punitive policies, once
defined as a search conducted by the government, must then be
justified. There are three possible avenues: (1) obtaining a war-
rant;169 (2) finding probable cause for arrest and a need for
urgent search;17 0 and (3) securing consent.17 1 Without question,
warrants are absent for the drug tests performed under punitive
policies. Such policies are largely self-executing since the physi-
cians perform the tests without direct supervision by the prose-
cutor or police. Health care providers lack access to warrants
without the assistance of the prosecutor or the police.
Punitive policies also lack any trace of justification for a
warrantless search. Both Schmerber and Lopez suggest that for
searches made incident to an arrest, there may be an exception
to the warrant requirement. 7 2 However, to qualify for this lim-
ited exception, the probable cause supporting the arrest must
typically be augmented by extenuating circumstances.'"3 First,
there must be insufficient time to visit the magistrate. 7 4 Sec-
ond, there must be some serious risk of the evidence being de-
stroyed or a significant danger of concealed weapons.
Schmerber, as well as the continued routine administration
of breathalyzer tests in the field, demonstrate that courts have
168. Statement by Dr. David Orenlichter, the AMA's Ethics and Health Policy
Counsel (stating "[i]f you try to make physicians agents of the state then you are going to
discourage people from using the health care system."). See Bruce Smith, MUSC Program
Under Fire, CHARLESTON NEWS & COURIER, Jan. 23, 1994, at B1.
169. See MICH 3 Study, supra note 39, at 4 (stating "[d]isclosure of Drug Test
results for criminal prosecutions would normally require a warrant.").
170. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
171. See MICH 3 Study, supra note 39, at 4; Hook v. Rothstein, 316 S.E.2d 690,
698 (S.C. 1984) (stating requirements for informed consent).
172. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); United States v. Lopez, 327
F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
173. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (applying the Schmerber balancing
test to a search incident to arrest and refusing to force a suspect to undergo surgery to have
a bullet removed for evidence); U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (endorsing a war-
rantless search of a person incident to arrest, but not dealing with invasive procedures).
174. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70 (citing United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56, 72-73 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
175. Id.; Lopez, 327 F.Supp. at 1093 (suggesting "hot pursuit," "danger of weap-
ons," and "destruction of evidence" as possible justifications for warrantless searches ac-
companying arrest).
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found the limited life of drug metabolites in the blood pose a
danger of evidence that may be destroyed.17 6 In drunk driving
cases, the arrestee's inebriated conduct provides the officer with
probable cause for arrest. 177 This probable cause for suspicion
of drug or alcohol abuse, when combined with the limited
timeframe for gathering medical evidence, arguably supports
warrantless testing.
Punitive policies are more problematic. Testing, based on
protocol factors rather than observed erratic behavior, lacks the
probable cause inherent in the drunk driving scenario. The pro-
tocol factors identified above1 78 seem sufficiently equivocal to
undermine any strong inference that a crime requiring immedi-
ate investigation has been committed.Y79 Without legitimate
reason to suspect the woman of a crime, there is no logical rea-
son to fear for the destruction of evidence.
Consent is also conspicuously absent. As previously dis-
cussed in reference to the right to bodily integrity, neither im-
plied nor express consent is present to authorize either the drug
testing or the disclosure of results to prosecutors.180 Failing to
even rise to the level of specificity required to satisfy the re-
quirements of informed medical consent, little justification can
be found for UDS tests performed primarily for the purpose of
prosecuting the patient.' 8'
176. South Carolina's drunk driving test is of interest. The arrestee has the option of
refusing the breathalyzer test. This refusal is tied to an automatic temporary suspension of
driving privileges. Regardless, it is significant that even arrestees in cases in which probable
cause is clearly present are at least given a choice regarding the test. See PATRICA S.
WATSON & WILLIAM S. McANNICH, GUIDE TO SOUTH CAROLINA CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 308 (3d ed. 1992).
177. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768.
178. Horger et al., supra note 45, at 528 (listing as protocol factors (1) no prenatal
care; (2) abruptio placentae; (3) intrauterine fetal death; (4) pre-term labor; (5) intrauter-
ine growth retardation; and (6) previously known drug or alcohol abuse).
179. Even while upholding protocol searches in the realm of airport hijackings, the
Lopez court spied "disquieting implications." Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1100. "Proposals
based upon statistical research designed to predict who might commit crimes and giving
them the special attention of law enforcement agencies is particularly disturbing." Id.
(emphasis added). The Court appeared fearful at the prospect of abuse under such
systems.
The abuse forecasted by the Lopez court has come to fruition with punitive policies.
Studies have indicated that the protocol factors are most effective at targeting poor women
of color. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
180. See supra part IV.A.2.
181. MICH 3 Study, supra note 39, at 4.
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Assertions of consent based on "blanket admission" con-
sent forms are unconvincing and ultimately irrelevant. The con-
sent gained by health care providers upon admission is a "med-
ical consent" rather than a consent waiving the patient's
constitutional rights. The plain reading of most admission
forms suggests that tests and procedures would be administered
based on "medical judgment."18 2 By performing the UDS
based on protocol rather than medical necessity, punitive poli-
cies necessarily exceed the bounds of any consent granted.
VI. STRICT SCRUTINY REVIEW REQUIRED
By forcing women to waive constitutional rights in order to
receive state-provided indigent medical care, punitive policies
unconstitutionally employ indirect compulsion to further law
enforcement policy.
Traditionally, the Court has taken great care in protecting
the Bill of Rights from both direct and indirect threats. As ar-
ticulated in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employ-
ment Security Division,"s even indirect compulsion is suspect
because "[w]hile the compulsion remains indirect, the infringe-
ment upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial. 1 82 4  The
Court has vociferously objected to such bargaining of rights,
claiming that by attaching differing prices to the exercise or
waiver of rights, economic realities too often strip away individ-
uals' freedoms and choices.185
With its focus on protecting the right to choose, the doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions broadly extends to most
rights of personal autonomy.18 6 The decision in St. Agnes Hos-
182. See Blanket Consent, supra note 47. The 1993 MUSC Patient Information
Handbook (Welcome to MUSC Medical Center) further bolsters the inference that test
results will remain confidential by stating that patients can expect privacy in their medical
care and medical records.
183. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
184. Id. at 718.
185. See, e.g., Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). In Weiman, the Court
deliberated on the propriety of forcing government employees to take a test oath renounc-
ing affiliation with prior political parties as a condition of retaining employment. Id. Justice
Black, in his concurrence, ridiculed such practices as a "tools of tyranny" and noted that
the policy effectively made employees buy continued employment through waiver of rights
to political choice, affiliation, and free speech. Id. at 193-94.
186. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv.
1413, 1426 (1989) (stating that "[p]ersons on the wrong side of an unalterable-characteris-
tic line are not hurt by any pressure to opt into the benefited class"). Such disparate treat-
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pital of the City of Baltimore v. Riddick'87 held that indirect
compulsion in which the "state action required the plaintiff to
choose between the exercise of its religion and the receipt of a
governmental benefit" was an unconstitutional limitation of the
First Amendment.1 88 Free speech also has been given similar
protection but the list is not so limited.1819 The doctrine also
extends protection to constitutional rights of personal
privacy. 90
Punitive policies present the poor with the unconstitutional
dilemma of having to choose between a governmental benefit of
health care and the exercise of their constitutional rights. Al-
though the policies stop short of creating active governmental
impediments, they exact a heavy toll for the receipt of medical
care. Only by ceding rights to free speech, freedom of religion,
freedom from illegal search and seizure, and freedom from
self-incrimination are the women affected by punitive policies
able to receive health care. By putting a cost (forbearance of
medical care) on the exercise of constitutional rights, such poli-
cies unacceptably engage in the indirect compulsion condemned
in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Se-
curity Division.19'
Government policies serving as a vehicle for the restriction
of protected rights must be justified under a strict scrutiny level
of review.' 92 In order to survive strict scrutiny, the state action
ment may be independently unconstitutional, yet it would not fall within the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions. However, "when government discriminates on the basis of an
alterable characteristic normally within the constitutionally protected discretion of the citi-
zen, pressure on autonomous choice is implicated." Id.
187. 748 F. Supp. 319 (D.Md. 1990).
188. Id. at 326.
189. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, at 597 (1972) (holding that the gov-
ernment may not deny benefits to a person based upon his or her exercise of free speech).
190. Sullivan, supra note 185, at 1427 (stating that "[g]overnment subsidies for the
medical expenses of pregnancy and childbirth but not abortion provide a paradigmatic ex-
ample."). Government benefits or burdens made contingent upon an individual's decision
regarding a constitutionally protected right appear to exert pressure in that protected do-
main. However, this example also highlights the Court's somewhat sporadic adherence to
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions when contrasted with decisions such as Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (upholding denial of state funds to pay for abortion). But
see LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 640, 651 (finding mandatory maternaty leave to be indirect bur-
den on reproductive autonomy).
191. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
192. Punitive policies constitute an unacceptable limitation on penumbral privacy
rights as well as the rights contained in the Fourth Amendment. Therefore the policies will
be subjected to strict scrutiny review. In the context of the First Amendment Establish-
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(1) must be justified by a compelling state interest, (2) must
display a narrowly tailored means-ends relationship, and (3)
there must be no less discriminatory alternative. 193
Proponents of punitive policies view them as valiant at-
tempts to further the legitimate state interests of curbing drug
use and improving child welfare. Unfortunately, as previously
discussed, significant problems are encountered by the means
employed. To paraphrase Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in
McCulloch v. Maryland, let the ends be legitimate, and all
means not repugnant to the Constitution are acceptable. 194
However, even when the state interests reach constitutional
proportions, the court in Goodall by Goodall v. Stafford
County School Board acknowledged that the state may not vio-
late one constitutional tenet to further another. 95 In Goodall,
parents sought a state-provided sign language interpreter for
their son's use in a private religious school. 96 The court noted
that the existence of Equal Protection problems (the interpreter
was provided in secular environments) did not justify the state's
providing assistance that would violate the Establishment
Clause.197
The state interests implicated by punitive policy programs
are arguably compelling. The laudatory goals of improved child
welfare and reduced drug use appear to fall within the state's
ment Clause, the court in Sherbert v. Verner stated that "if the purpose or effect of a law
is to impede the observance of one or all religions ... that law is constitutionally invalid
although the burden may be characterized as being only indirect." Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398,
404 (1963) (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)). While the right con-
sidered in Sherbert regarded freedom of religion and a number of other enumerated and
substantive rights meriting special protection, the penumbral privacy right has been identi-
fied as a right qualifying for increased protection under the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions. Sullivan, supra note 185, at 1426.
As demonstrated in Elrod v. Bums, the determination of the level of scrutiny is based
on whether the practice was "inimical to the process which undergirds our system of gov-
ernment ... and the deeper traditions of democracy." Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 357
(1976). The Bill of Rights and its associated penumbral rights are rights which are typi-
cally viewed as fundamental to our concept of liberty. Thus, when the doctrine of unconsti-
tutional conditions applies, strict scrutiny is the appropriate level of review. Sullivan, supra
note 185, at 1427.
193. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 363 (requiring "precision of regulation as the touchstone,"
and stating "[i]f the State has open to it a less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate
interests, it may not choose a legislative scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of personal
liberties").
194. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
195. 930 F.2d 363, 371 (4th Cir. 1991).
196. Id. at 364.
197. Id.
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traditional bastions of public health, safety, and welfare. How-
ever, to survive strict scrutiny, Elrod v. Burns cautioned that
"precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so
closely touching our most precious freedoms."1981 Not only must
there be a positive, demonstrable means-ends relationship, the
means also must be "narrowly tailored" to accomplish the
objective.199
Simply put, punitive policies fail strict scrutiny review be-
cause they fail to further the state interests proffered by the
government. Rather than curbing drug use and improving child
welfare, such programs have been shown to have an adverse
affect on fetal and maternal health. 00 Studies also have shown
treatment on a voluntary basis to be more successful.20 1 Again,
"[o]ne can compel attendance, but not meaningful participa-
tion. 202 By further retarding the delivery of prenatal care to
those women most in need, it is probable that child welfare is
diminished rather than enhanced. Since punitive policies ap-
pear inimical to the goal of improving child welfare and inef-
fective at curbing maternal drug use, such programs lack the
narrowly tailored means-ends relationship required to overcome
a constitutional challenge.
More effective methods requiring less restriction of consti-
tutional rights exist for attaining the ends sought by the state.
The Elrod court required that "[i] f the state has open to it a
less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate interests, it may not
choose a legislative scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of
personal liberties. 2 0 3 The remainder of this Note will address
198. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 363.
199. See, e.g., Weiman v. Updengraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952). In Weiman, the
state advanced the compelling interests in cooperative government and uniform policy in
support of loyalty oaths. Id. The Court concluded that there was no evidentiary or logical
basis to support the policy. Id. Without a clear demonstration of a positive relationship
between efficient government and the renunciation of political beliefs, the Court found that
the policy lacked the narrowly tailored means-ends required to survive strict scrutiny. Id.
200. Cole, supra note 3, at 2667 (stating such policies drive many mothers away
from care).
201. See Chavkin, supra note 68, at 1556-57.
202. Id. at 1559.
203. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 363. In Elrod, the state claimed that, among other things,
political patronage helped preserve the democratic process. The court readily accepted
preservation of democracy as a compelling state interest. However, it noted that patronage
was not shown to be effective in this manner and that the goal could likely be furthered by
less intrusive means. Id. at 372-73.
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more effective, yet less intrusive, means of addressing the
problems of maternal-fetal drug use.
VII. PROPOSED POLICY EFFORTS
The preferred solution to the problem of substance abuse
by pregnant women encompasses three broad areas. Education
must be the first priority. Second, treatment must be voluntary.
Finally, treatment must be both accessible to women and tai-
lored to their needs.
"The public must be assured of non-punitive access to
comprehensive care which will meet the needs of the substance-
abusing pregnant woman and her infant. ' 204 This call to arms
is in accord with the views of many medical and health associa-
tions. The APHA, ASAM, AMCH, March of Dimes, as well
as others, all conclude that drug problems should be addressed
as a public health issue. 20 5 As expressed by the ASAM, the law
should avoid the "prenatal child abuse" trend since punitive
policies are inappropriate and counter-productive. 206
Instead, the focus must be on education. The APHA and
ASAM both herald the need for increased educational ef-
forts.20 7 These calls appear prudent in light of opinions identi-
fying "education" as the "most cost-effective" method of deal-
ing with the problem.208 In fleshing out its proposal, the ASAM
identified four specific educational objectives:
(1) age-appropriate school-based education; (2) public media
forms of education including health warning labels, posters,
and various forms of public service announcements; (3) pre-
204. PEDIATRIcS, supra note 2, at 642.
205. APHA, supra note 2 (confirming that the organization views this as a public
health problem and recommends against punitive measures); AMCH, supra note 31;
MARCH Op DIMES, supra note 31.
206. ASAM, supra note 31 at 47, 49. This is not to suggest that it is unconstitu-
tional to punish drug use. The proposition is more limited. In general, to punish drug use
by incarceration or even mandatory treatment, the state might reasonably be viewed as a
medically positive response, even if it is not the most effective. However, from a health
perspective, punitive policies applied to pregnant women are counter productive.
Rather than producing a net positive result (even if less than ideal), women are driven
away from the health care system entirely. The adverse effects on fetal health outweigh the
questionable benefits of compelled treatment. Thus, the resulting negative impact on over-
all maternal-fetal health under punitive policies differentiates them from the typical drug
use case.
207. See APHA, supra note 2; ASAM, supra note 31, at 47; Cole, supra note 3, at
2668.
208. Chasnoff, supra note 4, at 1568.
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natal education about alcohol and other drugs for all preg-
nant women and significant others as part of adequate prena-
tal care; (4) professional education for all health care
professionals ... in the care of chemically dependent women
and their offspring.209
By employing voluntary, non-confrontational methods,
government efforts at curbing drug use will realize two benefits.
Most notably, voluntary programs would avoid the marriage of
medicine to the state criminal system which has driven women
out of the health care system and possibly hurt more fetuses
than it has helped. 10 By avoiding the adversarial relationship
between a woman and the fetus, as well as the patient and the
physician, trust and disclosure will improve diagnostic and
treatment results. Additionally, there are some indications that
women entering treatment on a voluntary basis are more likely
to be successful in rehabilitation.211
Second, voluntary programs largely avoid the constitu-
tional pitfalls encountered with punitive policies. This benefit of
voluntary treatment and public education programs prompted
the MICH Council to recommend that "[elfforts to address...
drug use during pregnancy should focus on prevention, educa-
tion, and treatment programs which do not affect the constitu-
tional rights of the pregnant woman. 212 Without compulsion,
education and voluntary treatment allow women to retain free-
dom and dignity - ideals firmly within the aegis of the
Constitution.
Finally, treatment services must be tailored to the needs of
women and must be available on a vastly increased scale. The
Coalition on ADDWIC's finding that women desiring to enter
treatment must face a six to eighteen month waiting list dem-
onstrates that demand far exceeds supply.213 Treatment delays
can be catastrophic. Once a woman has resolved to seek treat-
ment, immediate admission must be available, for even mini-
mal delays can lead to a change of heart.
In addition to the need for treatment space, women also
have specific needs in treatment. At present, "[m]ost programs
209. ASAM, supra note 31, at 47.
210. See George J. Annas, Protecting the Liberty of Pregnant Patients, 316 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1213, 1214 (1987); ASAM, supra note 31, at 47.
211. Chavkin, supra note 68, at 1556-57.
212. MICH 3 Study, supra note 39, at 3.
213. ADDWTC, supra note 28, at 1.
480 [Vol. 5:443
PUNITIVE POLICIES
[are] designed for males and are not responsive to the psycho-
logical, social, and economic conditions in women's lives. 214
The most basic need that must be addressed is that of child
care. Programs designed to effectively treat women must pro-
vide some form of child care. With current facilities, women
often must choose between receiving treatment and abandoning
their children.215 With child care provided, women would be
freer to pursue the long-term residential care viewed as most
effective in dependency treatment.
Another significant hurdle is the financial barrier. The
money currently spent prosecuting and mandating treatment
for unreceptive mothers might be better spent on increasing the
availability of treatment. The acceptance of Medicaid at drug
treatment facilities also has been suggested as a method of ex-
216panding access.
Transportation barriers faced by women desiring treat-
ment also must be eliminated.17 A significant number of sub-
stance abusing women lack the financial resources to commute
to outpatient treatment. While perhaps not as vital in urban
environments featuring mass transit systems, in more rural ar-
eas the problem is real.
The Southern Legislative Summit on Healthy Infants and
Babies tackled this problem with concrete suggestions.218 The
summit recounted several possible solutions. In particular,
"Mom Vans," donated vehicles which could make weekly
rounds to provide shuttle service to the needy, were lauded.219
As an example, the successful Washington, D.C. program in
which donated vans were operated on stipends received from
the city was cited. Another workable solution was the provision
of bus or subway tokens. 20 Perhaps the most innovative propo-
sal was that of a "mobile treatment unit. ' 221 Regardless of the
214. Paltrow, supra note 24, at 86.
215. Paltrow, supra note 24, at 86; ASAM, supra note 31, at 48; Chasnoff, supra
note 4.
216. See Maternal Rights, supra note 43, at 1012; ADDWTC, supra note 28, at 1;
SOUTHERN LEGISLATIVE SUMMIT ON HEALTHY INFANTS AND FAMILIES 4, SOUTHERN RE-
GIONAL PROJECT ON INFANT MORTALITY 1, 4 (1990) [hereinafter SOUTHERN SUMMIT].
217. Chasnoff, supra note 4, at 1568.
218. SOUTHERN SUMMIT, supra note 215, at 6.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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solution selected, the logic is inescapable. By making treatment
more accessible to those in need, more women will be willing to
undertake the commitment.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Proposals resting on education, voluntary treatment, and
increased access are hardly a panacea. What they do represent
is a more medically effective way to deal with the problem of
substance abuse by pregnant women. They also avoid employ-
ing means repugnant to the Constitution. While fears regarding
cost and funding abound, these issues may be specious. Consid-
ering the cost of the current system (both in dollars and in
rights) compared with the surprising lack of success, searching
for new solutions to the problem appears the only socially re-
sponsible avenue.
